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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following are the constitutional and statutory provisions which are addressed in 
this appeal: 
§30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). "When a decree of divorce is 
rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties.55 
STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
l§78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996). 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Did the Court abuse its discretion in finding the appreciation on the Bear 
Lake cabin to be marital property? ccMarital property encompasses all of the assets of every 
nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.55 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1978 (Utah 1988). 
II. Did the Court abuse its discretion by apportioning to Merlin the premarital 
value of the Bear Lake Cabin and declining to apportion to Merlin as separate property the 
appreciation on the cabin accumulated during the parties5 28-year marriage? The 
appreciation on the cabin came as a result of 28 years of substantial additions and 
improvements to which both parties contributed. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 
304 (Utah 1988). 
HI. Did the Court abuse its discretion by not dividing the costs of the appraisals 
incurred solely by the appellant? Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990) 
stands for the proposition that, "neither land surveys nor appraisal fees, incurred in 
preparation for litigation, are recoverable as costs.55 Id. at 684. 
IV. Did the Court abuse its discretion in denying appellant's post trial motions 
to take additional evidence on the monies received from the sale of the parties5 St. George 
property? Appellant's post-trial motions were properly denied where all the 
documentation he requested was solely within Merlin5s possession and could have easily 
been raised by Merlin at trial. 
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STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce in the Second 
District Court, Davis County, Layton Department in which the Honorable Darwin C. 
Hansen divided both premarital and marital property. The court assessed a value to the 
respondent's premarital interest in a summer home on Bear Lake and considered the 
remainder of the increase in equity of the property as a marital asset. The court then 
awarded the respondent the Bear Lake home and property but offset the petitioner's 
marital interest in the property by awarding her other interests. Respondent also appeals 
from the courts denial of apportionment of appraisal costs and the court's denial of a post 
trial motion to take additional evidence. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Trial was held in the above 
matter on October 8th and 9th, 1998 at the Layton District Court, die Honorable Darwin 
C. Hansen presiding. Thereafter, the court issued a written Memorandum Decision on 
October 20, 1998. The respondent filed two post-trial motions, first, a Motion to Assess 
Costs on November 18, 1998, and, second, a Motion to Reconsider Court Ruling and/or 
Re-Open Trial to Take Additional Testimony and Evidence. The court denied the 
respondent's post-trial motions on December 16, 1998. The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were signed by Judge Hansen on February 22, 
1999, at a supplementary hearing on the property division. The respondent appealed. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
1. The parties were married on or about the 21st day of October, 1969. TT. Vol. 
I, p. 17, L. 1-4. 
2. The parties separated on or about the 4th day of November, 1997. TT. Vol. I, 
p. 25, L. 10-13. 
3. The parties have no children together, but each party has several children from 
prior marriages. TT. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 3-17. 
4. At the time of the parties5 marriage, Louise's five minor children and Merlin's 
four children resided with the parties at the marital residence. TT. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 3-17. 
5. At nearly every job that Merlin held, for almost 28 years, Louise was also 
employed alongside Merlin, because "he asked her to do so because he needed her help and 
support.55 TT. Vol. I, p. 19. 
6. At the time of the parties5 marriage, Merlin was the record owner of two parcels 
of land at Bear Lake. An "A55 frame cabin was constructed on one of these parcels. TT. 
Vol. I, p. 43 L. 5-8. 
7. During the course of this 28 year marriage, various additions and improvements 
to the original CCA55 frame cabin were made by the parties, including the addition of three 
bedrooms, a new roof, a garage, a gate and posts, several turrets, and a sewer line. TT. 
Vol. 1, p. 46-50 generally. 
8. While Merlin completed the majority of the heavy labor associated with the 
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additions and improvements to the cabin, Louise was right by his side, doing everything 
she could to maintain the grounds and the cabin itself. TT. Vol. 1, p. 46-50 generally. 
9. While title to the cabin remained in Merlin's name, any expenses associated with 
the cabin (including utilities and property taxes) were paid for out of marital funds. TT. 
Vol. I, p. 47, L. 18-25. 
10. Insurance on this cabin was also maintained in the name of Merlin and Louise 
Symes. TT. Vol. H, p. 364, L. 5-15. 
11. At trial, the trial court awarded Merlin his premarital interest in the Bear Lake 
cabin and found that the appreciation which resulted from the many additions to the cabin 
to be marital property. R. 103. 
12. The trial court ultimately awarded Merlin the Bear Lake cabin, but offset 
Louise's interest in the appreciation accumulated during the parties' 28-year marriage, by 
awarding her other interests. R. 104. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court has broad discretion in reaching an equitable distribution of the 
parties marital assets and can take into consideration the premarital estates of either party as 
it relates to the overall division and to the extent that the court finds that there has been 
efforts on the part of the other party toward the enhancement, maintenance and protection 
of the property. The court was not required to apportion the premarital value as 
advocated by the respondent particularly where the court can determine that the other 
spouse has enhanced the value of the property during the course of the marriage and where 
the evidence was clear that the original CCA55 frame cabin had be remodeled and additions 
added repeatedly during the course of the marriage. The court is further not required to 
believe the testimony of the respondent's children over the testimony of the petitioner 
regarding her understanding of the source of funds for the additions, utilities, insurance 
and maintenance. 
The court does have a right to 2^sess costs but the Court of Appeals has specifically 
stated that neither the cost of land surveys nor appraisals incurred in preparation for 
litigation are recoverable costs. 
The trial court, after a second, unscheduled day of trial, can in its discretion deny the 
motion of the respondent to hear additional evidence particularly where the complaint of 
the respondent regarding the claimed information was not raised at trial. In actuality the 
respondent had sufficient notice of all issues particularly as they were raised in the discovery 
6 
which answers were not provided to the petitioner until halfway through the first day of 
trial. The issues regarding the funds were related to a bank account in the respondents 
name only where the parties did not have a joint marital account and therefore the 
information was not in the control of the petitioner. If anyone has a complaint about the 
inability to prepare for trial testimony, it is the petitioner who had to prepare her case 
without the benefit of the respondent's overdue answers to discovery. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
IN FINDING THAT THE APPRECIATION ON 
PREMARITAL PROPERTY OF THE RESPONDENT WAS A 
MARITAL ASSET UNDER THE FACTS IN THIS CASE. 
The trial court was well within its discretion in finding the appreciation on the Bear 
Lake cabin to be a marital asset. The seminal case on this issue is Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 
133 (Utah 1987). The Court set forth the general rule that, cc[p]remarital property, gifts, 
and inheritances may be viewed as separate property, and in appropriate circumstances, 
equity will require that each party retain the separate property brought to the marriage. 
However, the rule is not invariable.55 Id. at 135. The Court set forth thirteen (13) factors 
that the trial court should consider in fashioning an equitable property division.55 Id. 
These factors are: 
[T]he amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the property was 
acquired before or during the marriage; the source of the property; the 
health of the parties; the parties5 standard of living, respective financial 
conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of the marriage; the 
children of the marriage; the parties5 ages at time of marriage and of divorce; 
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what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship the 
property division has with the amount of alimony and child support to be 
awarded. Id. 
The Court further stated that of specific concern is ccwhether one spouse has made 
any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether 
the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.55 IdL In Burke, 
the increase in land value came solely from inflation, whereas in the present case, the 
increase in land value came from substantial improvements to the land, specifically 
numerous additions to the original CCA55 frame cabin, which occurred repeatedly during this 
20-year marriage. 
The Burke court gave further guidance to trial courts in determining an equitable 
division of property: 
In the exercise of their discretion, trial courts need to be guided by the 
general purpose to be achieved by a property division, which is to allocate 
the property in a manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best 
permits them to pursue their separate lives. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded in Burke that Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 
confers ccbroad discretion upon trial courts in the division of property, regardless of its 
source or time of acquisition.55 IcL at 134-35; Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 
1991) cert, denied^ 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Further, "in appropriate circumstances, 
one spouse may be awarded property which the other spouse brought in to the marriage.55 
Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992); Workman v. Workman. 652 P.2d 931, 
933 (Utah 1982) (holding that "achieving a fair, just, and equitable result may require that 
8 
the trial court exercise its discretion to award one spouse the premarital property of the 
other.55). Judge Hansen was cognizant of the fact that the cabin was acquired before the 
marriage and awarded Merlin his premarital interest. The court however, exercised its 
discretion in finding that the appreciation on the cabin was marital property. 
In Mortensen, the Court consolidated the thirteen (13) factors discussed in Burke. 
The Court concluded that trial court should award premarital property to the party who 
brought the property into the marriage, unless: 
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring 
an equitable interest in i t , . . . or (2) the property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring 
spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse. IcL at 308. 
The Petitioner has, by her efforts and expenses, contributed substantially to the 
enhancement, maintenance, and protection of the Bear Lake property, as identified in the 
trial court's findings. When the parties were first married in 1970 and Merlin brought the 
cabin to the marriage, Louise testified to the nature of the land and the cabin as it was at 
that time: a small "A" frame cabin which consisted of two bedrooms and two loft 
bedrooms. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, Line 9-13. Louise then testified that in about 1980, the 
cabin has a total of seven (7) bedrooms with a garage being added. TT. Vol. I, p. 46, L. 
21-23. Similarly, during the course of the marriage, a sewer line was put in which the 
residents paid for, TT. Vol. I, p. 48, Line 9-12, a gate and posts were added to the 
property, as well as turrets. As of 1996, the cabin has "been made to look like a castle type 
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Vol. 48, Line 20-25. At some point during the course of the marriage, a new roof 
was also placed on the cabin. TT. Vol. I, p. 49 ,1 , 1 0 1 2 Petitioner's exhibits 2.. 3^  4. ~, 
and 13 are photographs or mc cabin taken throughout the parties5 marriage. These 
p i l o t O*. a p t . '•>:* * ' - r ^ i ' ^ - U * r . . i > ! * . ' : J >: » : -
cabin during the parties5 28-year marriage. 
Louise testified that any and all monthly bills, utilities, and taxes on the cabin were 
paid Inn oiili in,u it,ill 1(111 II1 I I ill I |i 4 1 I iii
 (',i |i I I I Ionise llidpal ju\ 
for the respective bills with her income from Social Security. TT. Vol. II, p. 325. Merlin 
also testified that the insurance on the cabin had both Merlin's and Louise's names on it. 
Therefore, if any damage was to occur to the cabin, any insurance payments would have 
contradicted herself. When Louise was asked, cc[d]o you know for sure that marital funds 
were used for the Bear Lake property,55 after a leading question was sustained, Louise 
t( SUIK 
L. 10-25. 
During the twenty-eight years that Louise and Merlin were married^ when they and 
their respective families would go to this cabs.., Louise testified to the following: 
There was always lots of work to be done. I always cooked all the meals,, 
washed all the dishes, cleaned the cabin, tried to make it an enjoyable 
weekend for everyone. I weeded in the yard. I eventually planted flowers, 
scrubs, and things in the yard to make it more beautiful. And then I took all 
• • 1 
the laundry home. The bedding and everything, the towels and all and 
washed during the week while I was working. TT. Vol. I, p. 56, L. 4-11. 
Judge Hansen found the above financial and labor contributions and efforts toward 
improvements by Louise to be sufficient to categorize the appreciation on the cabin as 
marital property. 
The Court in Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) stated another 
general rule: "Marital property encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by 
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.55 Id. at 1078. The 
Court in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d431,432-33 (Utah 1982) also emphasized 
that: 
Whether a resource is subject to distribution does not turn on whether the 
spouse can presendy use or control it, or on whether the resource can be 
given a present dollar value. The essential criterion is whether a right to the 
benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during the marriage. 
Clearly, without specifically stating as such, the trial court found that Louise accrued a 
right to the cabin (the appreciation which accrued during the marriage) because of her 
substantial contributions to the asset for 28 years. 
The cases have consistently followed the rule of law set forth in Mortensen. In Burt 
v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990) the Court held that premarital property 
of a party is not beyond the coiirfs reach in an equitable property division. See Also 
Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988); Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 
(Utah 1973); Bailey v. Bailey. 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987); Argyle v. Argyle. 688 
11 
P.2d468 (Utah 1984); Ncwmcyci v. Newman ' I ! *• ! 1987). 
Appellant argues that the efforts Louise made to contribute to the cabin didn't rise 
to a level to classify the appreciation on the cabin as marital property. This determination 
App. 1990) sets forth very specifically the efforts that can be considered by the trial court 
in determining a distribution of marital property. The Dunn Court refused to weigh 
fn lai icia 1 coi itributions eacl: I pai tnei i nade to tl le marriage in dividing marital property. It 
held that cc[s]uch an analysis ignores contributions of love, n * ••
 ;i-MM\ u .. \d 
companionship, which elude monetary valuation.55 IcL at 1322. 
Louise testified that, at the time of the parties5 marriage, her five (5) minor children 
at id • - • i ] i. a i ita 1 residence ' ' >1 I, 
p. 18, L. 3-17. Louise testified that she was the primary caretaker of these nine {9) 
children TT, Vol. I, p. 1 8,1 , 20-21
 5 and "was employed with Merlin in most, in nearly all 
tlle jobs that he evei naa during the marriage, , . ->. 
±-
because he told her that cche needed [her] help in the jobs and so [she] went to support 
[her] husband.53 • • - M I ouise has a teaching degree, but gave it up 
in nul l in ihi suppnii Hi i lui.sb.md, and to "make the mi in IMI|;I1 "o ill. " T l " iill l ( |i II"11111, 1 . 
23-25, p. 20, L. 1 6 . She sacrificed income, retirement, and most importantly: the 
opportunity pursue her dream of teaching. Louise has no retirement available to her 
12 
because she gave that up when she went to work at nearly every job Merlin held for twenty-
eight (28) years. TT. Vol. I, p. 22, L. 17-21. 
Louise was an equal partner in this marriage of twenty-eight (28) years. Her many 
contributions, although not of extreme monetary value, cannot be overlooked. Louise 
testified that Merlin has been fired consistendy throughout the parties nearly twenty-eight 
(28) year marriage "from most of his jobs, from coast to coast.55 TT. Vol. II, p. 293, L. 6-
8. Louise was asked why she didn't apply for jobs to supplement the parties'incomes. TT. 
Vol. II, p. 292, L. 9-10. Her response was: u[b]ecause I needed to be with my husband to 
help him keep a job and support him in keeping employment. He always asked me to 
come in and help him.55 TT. Vol. H, p. 292, L. 11-13. 
A similar case to the one at hand arose in Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260 
(Utah App. 1993), the Court vacated an award of a hardware store to the party who 
brought the store into the marriage. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court never 
"considered [appellant's] contributions in determining what financial benefits, if any, 
accrued to the hardware store by virtue of her contributions, financial or otherwise, during 
the period of the marriage.55 Id. at 263. The trial court made specific and adequate 
findings as to the many contributions Louise made both to the marriage, and to the Bear 
Lake cabin. It was therefore not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find that the 
appreciation on the cabin was a marital asset. 
13 
n T H E T R I A L C O U R T U S E D I T S E Q U r i A B L E POWERS 
IN DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE PREMARITAL 
VALUE OF THE BEAR LAKE CABIN AND THE APPORTIONMENT 
OF THE APPRECIATION THEREON. 
Under §30-3-5, Utah Cx>de Annotated (1953 as amended), the Utah Supreme 
C ouit is well as the I itah < own ot Appeals lias consistently held that " there is no fixed 
rule or formula for the division of property, th< fiuleomf li i side disci cti« m in pmpnt \ 
division, and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can 
be demonstrated." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 305-06 (Utah 1988); Bushell 
v. BiLshclL <»•!*' I" M S'i (1 "« ill I'W ' Snnil IIII Is, ill Hi li j |n Uati 1 ^>uiis <|i IIMIII lij'Juh 
disturb a trial court's division of property in a divorce decree and will uphold a division 
made in accordance with the standards we have set and in the exercise of the trial court's 
discretion "except where to do so would w oii a manifest injustice or inequity.J" Noble v. 
Noble. 761 V M I3f><> /Huh I'WI; (aunfnm Pusc\ v. PLLSCV. y^ V V 
1986). See Also Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). IMu 
manifest injustice or inequity will result if the trial court's division of property is upheld. 
As tin inal HIIIIH1* Mrmoi .unlnm J )u i .inn mi in JU s., gii jf luinlis win I tkni 1^  tin fn,d 
court to insure that the division of property was equal. See generally Memorandum 
Decision R. 101-108 
The o\nndjii(t» n>iisnli J .it ion iui ilic: d i tl MHIH I I I fashioning an equitable 
distribution of property is tcthat the ultimate division be equitable-that pioprrt\ ix i JII ly 
divided between the parties, given their contributions during the marriage and their 
1 4 
circumstances at the time of the divorce." Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, at 1278. Louise 
contributed 28 years of her life to the maintenance and enhancement of the family. As part 
of her contribution, Louise maintained the marital residence as well as the parties5 cabin to 
make it comfortable for everyone. Like many families, Merlin contributed his time and 
energy to building the additions to the cabin and Louise contributed her time and energy 
to the enhancement of the cabin, which included cooking, cleaning, laundry, yard work, 
and support and encouragement to Merlin. 
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to apportion to Merlin his premarital 
interest in the Bear Lake cabin. However, as the courfs Memorandum Decision indicates, 
Merlin was awarded his premarital interest in the cabin of $12,000. The trial court heard 
arguments from both parties on what they believed the value of the cabin was at the time 
of the marriage. However, the trial court rejected appellee's argument that the original 
value of the cabin should be based on the valuation of the cabin for property tax purposes. 
The trial court also rejected appellant's argument that the value at the time of the parties5 
marriage is irrelevant. The trial court determined the current value of the cabin based on 
the following: 
If the adjacent lot, which is the same size as the cabin lot was worth $5,000 
when initially sold [in 1974] and is now worth $50,000, then by negative 
extrapolation, the cabin and its lot which is now worth $119,000 would have 
been valued at approximately $12,000 at the time of the parties5 marriage. 
R. 104. 
The trial court exercised its discretion in determining the value of the cabin before the 
15 
n-MJiU; • 'Tlic IM.II inurl ,u ni.illy deeemnnnl fix1 VJIIII" ol the Heir I ,.ikc i ,ibm JIKI !(\ lot 
based solely upon the testimony of appellant5s appraiser. Appellee is at a loss to see how 
appellant can argue the trial court stated the cabin was entirely marital property. Clearly, 
J i u y c i M U M *u * • • • • .v -
determined by the court) at the time of the marriage. The court then determined the 
appreciation which accrued during the marriage to be marital property. 
1 t±E COURT DID NOT ERR BY REFUSING 
TO DIVIDE THE COST OF APPRAISALS 
OBTAINED BY THE RESPONDENT. 
The petitioner is somewhat confused by this issue. Not only is the trial court, in its 
cisv'T w ie 
respondent specifically states that the trial court cannot assess appraisal costs. In Morgan v. 
Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 687, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically stated, '"Furthermore, 
our appellate courts make a distinction between legitimate and taxable 'Yosts11 and it her 
"expenses " ioi i, which ma y be ever so necessary , but are not taxable as costs.1 for 
instance, neither land surveys nor appraisal fees, incurred in preparation for litigation, are 
recoverable as costs.55 Id. at 684 (quoting Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 77 1, 7 74 ) All of 
the appraisals uUain-vl h\ (It,' respondnil wvi" m ptquufifiii Un tn il ,md, tlirnfm,, , the 
court could not even consider the request made by the respondent for division of these 
expenses as costs apportionable by the court. No finding by the court is necessary when 
i * > 
the issue is a matter of law as set forth by a higher court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT MAY DENY POST TRIAL MOTIONS 
WHEN THE COURT, IN ITS DISCRETION, BELIEVES 
N O ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY, 
At the close of the two-day trial, appellant made a motion to re-consider the trial 
court's ruling and to re-open the trial to take additional testimony and evidence. As one of 
the reasons for this motion, Appellant alleges that the documentation regarding the monies 
which the parties received from the sale of the St. George property were solely within the 
control of Appellee. 
The trial court5s decision not to hear additional testimony is wholly within the trial 
court's discretion and will not be overturned unless a clear abuse of discretion has occurred. 
Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). While it is true that appellant's motion was 
filed before the entry of the final decree, it is not true that nothing in the pre-trial discovery 
or pleadings could have alerted appellant to the fact that large sums of money received and 
spent during the marriage would be at issue at trial. 
The trial court decided to deny appellant's motion to hear additional evidence, 
particularly because this information could have easily been raised at trial. Appellant did 
have sufficient notice of each and every issue Louise intended to raise at trial. These issues 
were raised in Louises5 Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
Appellant failed to answer these requests in a timely manner, and in fact only provided 
17 
them t :: 1 01 ii.se ha If * ;ray t 1 i i 01 igl 11 1 le fit st d; ly of t t I i! I I * > oil, IL , p 103. I 5 2.2. 
Appellant also alleges that he could not have anticipated information on the monies 
received from the sale of the parties5 St. George property would be needed at trial, 
particularly where he alleges all the records pertaining to this issue were wholly witnin i; \c 
coin ii ill ot I ,OUIM I lir. is Mil in iph in if li II* In 11* ( Mnlin ti • l it in] at tri il tli.il ,i |i in it h nils 
account did not exist. He further testified that the funds from the sale of the St. George 
property was deposited into his separate account. TT. Vol. II, p. 466. Therefore^ since 
this claimed infbrmatioi i. wa si i 11 aised. at ti iai, ai id \\ as ii i fact. ii i Mei lit i s possessioi i. ti le 
entire time, Appellant's argument is without merit. 
As the Supreme Court of Utah stated in Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 
1980): 
CC[1J1 the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a 
motion for reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself,. . . 
[i]n order to avoid such a state of indecision for both the judge and the 
parties, practical expediency demands that there be some finality to the 
actions of the court; and he should not be in the position of having the 
further duty of acting as a court of review upon his own ruling.55 Id. at 843 
(quoting Drurv v. Lunceford. 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966)). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was well within its discretion in determining that the appreciation on 
the Bear Lake cabin was marital property. Judge Hansen found that Louise made 
during the parties5 28-year marriage. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
apportioning to Merlin the premarital value of the cabin and ultimately awarding to Merlin 
the entire cabin with an offset to Louise (in the form of other interests) of her marital 
interest in the cabin. The trial court also acted within its discretion by not dividing the 
costs of the appraisals which were solely incurred by Merlin and in denying Merlin's post-
trial motions to take additional evidence. 
DATED this /ff^day of October, 1999. 
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j . . r*. • t . • - •
 t . r \ - \ty • . , t 
2 Lake Li::y, Jc . i Lake Cour 'y, :>ta! , October 21st, .1970; 
3 -i s ' H^! correct? 
1 ,:i, \ : r c . 
5 '•-•' -.--.y d:o you file for •1-vorce, Louise? 
6 ;:hr situation became so abusive ar: I so 
7 i L : e d L e • i ; r.! J , .* • ; . ': a ^  o a\ : a i. • e c a MI t > . Led:: .ii M. \ .;;•••< 
8
 : militant, I i id no choice but * •:• tr, *o file for divorce i i I 
9 r sv ;;est interest of everybody for Luc safety of aii. He 
10 ; •**: hreateni ng myse^i a. wuii as other people, 
11 Di d you believe he had the me an s to carry out 
12 j those threats? 
13 I le certainly di ., 
14 j MR. TYCKSEN: Objection. 'rrelevance. Your 
1 5 -*•' •* f . t . . : .
 : i; :or 
16 apparent irreconcilable differences ind the -.estimony is 
1 7 tn_*_ jb_ believes shp suffered a?- ir .^t o f ; tress. 
18 TIH T^ * ,ere any :n :e ason fc :i : • * - *:i onal 
19 grounds? 
20 MS. BEAN: Yes, your Honoi. It goes to the issue 
21 of a ] i iiiO'i ly ar :i 1:1 ial : i K bi 1 >] « >s) . 
22 I THE C0UR1 : :'o;. may proceed. 
23 I Mi' BEAN: The replacing of that really does not 
2 J j co ver i t: t . . 
25 Q (MS. BEAN) There are no children borne as issue 
i / 
of this marriage, correct? 
A That's true. 
Q And you had five minor children prior to this 
marriage? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And Mr. Symes had four children who were living 
with you, correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q Where was the fourth child? 
A The fourth child was already previously married. 
Q How old were your children at the time of the 
marriage? 
A My oldest child was fifteen and the youngest was 
six. 
Q And how old were Mr. Symesf children? 
A The ones that lived with us would have been 
seventeen down to about fourteen. 
Q And who was the primary caretaker of these 
children? 
A I cared for all their needs; cooked their meals, 
washed their clothes, sent them to school- I did for them. 
Q Okay. Were you employed during the course of the 
marriage? 
A Yes, I was, with my husband. 
Q By doing what? 
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A I was employed by European Health Spa during the 
years in Florida, I was employed by Golden Villa Spa in 
Salt Lake. I was employed for a brief time by his sister 
when we entered the shop. 
MR. TYCKSEN: Your Honor, my client can't hear 
this testimony. She needs to speak louder. 
THE COURT: Just speak up a little. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. I was employed by European 
Health Spas when we lived in Florida. I was employed by 
his sister when we lived in Salt Lake, briefly at a dress 
shop called Marie's. I was employed by Golden Villa Spa 
when Merlin worked there. I was employed by Golden Villa 
which took over Johnny Johnson's spas in Oregon when we 
lived there and then I was employed with Merlin in most, in 
nearly all the jobs that he ever had during the marriage. 
I was also employed by Spa Lady in our years ih California. 
I was also employed by Mountain Coin where he worked in 
Salt Lake. 
Q (BY MS. BEAN) These are the same employers as Mr. 
Symes? 
A Yes, they were. 
Q Why? 
A Mr. Symes said that he needed my help in the jobs 
and so I went to support my husband. I had an education to 
teach but I gave that up in order to support him and make 
19 
the marriage work, 
Q Okay. Did you have personal employment goals? 
A Yes, I did. I planned to teach. I had a very 
fine record with my education. I planned to carry on with 
that. I could have built a good retirement had I not 
sacrificed it. 
Q Do you recall the most that you made per hour at 
any of these — 
A I started out at minimum wage on everyone of 
them. And then I was kept on minimum wage. The bulk of 
the larger amounts went into my husband's account and I 
just basically supported him and started at minimum wage. 
And then when I became a manager in California when we 
worked for Spa Lady I was making more money. I would have 
made the most money I've probably made during the marriage 
then. I would have been paid on commission basis according 
to what I sold. 
Q Okay. When did you last work? 
A I last worked in ^92. 
Q Okay. Why did you quit? 
A I suffered a very severely broken leg and ankle 
and ribs. I was in a wheelchair. I was unable to walk for 
nine months and completely in the care of a caring 
relative. 
Q Who was that caring relative? 
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1 A Yes, I do-
2 Q And what is your current condition on those? 
3 A My health has deteriorated greatly in the last 
4 twenty-eight years, particularly in the last five and 
5 especially in the last two, I have stomach ulcers. I have 
6 many gastrointestinal problems. I have colon problems; a 
7 spastic colon, irritable bowel- I suffer from interstitial 
8 cystitis of the bladder which is a most painful condition 
9 and there is no cure for it. I also suffered a heart 
10 attack in the past and I have a rapid and irregular heart 
11 beat now, yes, I do. 
12 Q Okay. And is your condition agitated by stress? 
13 A Yes. My doctors tell me it's all stress 
14 oriented. 
15 Q Okay. Do you have any medical insurance? 
16 A Only Medicare and AARP. 
17 Q Okay. Do you have any retirement income? 
18 A No, I do not. 
19 Q Why not? 
20 A Because I was working at a job to support my 
21 husband where there was no retirement income available. 
22 Q Okay. You've asked for alimony, correct? 
23 A Yes, I have. 
24 Q Why? 
25 A Because the church has had to help me with my 
22 
1 Judge Robert Hilder dated April 24, 1998. Is that the 
2 order, counsel, that you are referring to? 
3 MR, TYCKSEN: That's the order, 
4 THE COURT: All right. The Court has a copy of 
5 that. I read it and we'll feel leave to refer to it as 
6 part of this proceeding if neither counsel objects. 
7 MR. TYCKSEN: I have a copy of it marked as an 
8 exhibit if you want it. 
9 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
10 Q (BY MS. BEAN) All right. Let's back up just a 
11 little bit. When did you and Mr. Symes (inaudible)? 
12 A November 4, 1997. 
13 Q Under what conditions did you separate? 
14 A Threats and abuse on my life and on the lives of 
15 other people. I had to leave the house. I was told I 
16 would be thrown through the front door. I hadn't had my 
17 trip to the front door yet. He made threats on judicial 
18 people and his former employer and at some point I had to 
19 start taking these seriously- I had discussed them with 
20 professionals before. 
21 Q Where was Mr. Symes living at the time? 
22 A He was living at Layton, Utah, where he always 
23 lived. 
24 Q And where did the two of you keep your personal 
25 property at Layton (inaudible)? 
25 
A The highway is right in my backyard. Highway 89 
borders my backyard. 
Q Okay. How old are you, Louise? 
A I'm sixty-two, be sixty-three in January. 
Q Okay. Let's move on to the Bear Lake Property. 
It's your understanding that Mr. Symes originally owned 
this property prior to the marriage, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And when, at the time of your marriage 
what was the nature of the property? 
A The nature of the property, there were no grass, 
no scrubs, anything put in. It was a small "A" frame cabin 
that had two bedrooms with two loft bedrooms. 
Q How many lots? 
A I thought there were two separate lots. There 
was one that was undeveloped that joins onto the Northern 
side. 
Q Okay. Where is this property located in 
direction to the lake? 
A It's right on water front. It's right on the 
lake. 
Q Okay. All right. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'd be interested in knowing 
which side of the lake? 
MR. TYCKSEN: On the East side of the lake. 
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of the cabin, it looks like there is some boat storage 
underneath there, is that right? 
A Yes, 
Q And there are some boats there? 
A Yes. There were canoes, catamarans, that type of 
thing, stored under the porch. 
MS. BEAN: Okay. Can I approach the witness, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (BY MS. BEAN) I'm going to show you what has 
been marked at petitioner's Exhibit 3, we would also ask 
that the record reflect that (inaudible). Can you identify 
that picture for us, please? 
A Yes. This is another photo of the cabin at Bear 
Lake. The yard was still not developed. Merlin is 
standing out in the front yard, he's walking along. This 
was taken about 1980 after we returned from employment with 
Spa Lady in California, and the stained glass windows, the 
garage, and the addition is being made at that time to the 
cabin. 
Q Okay. Were there bedrooms added at that time? 
A Yes. It now has a total of seven bedrooms. 
There were three additional added and a garage. 
Q All right. And that would have been prior to 
1980 according to that photo? 
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^ A We returned during tne Fall of y19 from 
g California. So this photo was probably taken about early 
£ in 1980. 
4 Q Okay. How old were Mr. Symes' sons in 1980? 
5 A Craig was born in *55 and Scott in A53 so they 
b would have been about 25 and 27. 
7 Q Okay. To your knowledge how was the addition 
8 paid for? 
9 A I donf t know. 
10 Q Okay. Do you know for sure that marital funds 
11 were used for the Bear Lake property? 
12 A Yes. 
13 MR. TYCKSEN: She's already testified she doesn't 
14 know. I think counsel is leading the witness. 
15 (All Talking) 
16 THE COURT: Ifm going to sustain the objection in 
17 terms of leading the witness. 
18 | Q (BY MS. BEAN) All right. Louise, did you ever 
19 pay for anything? 
20 A Yes. We always paid the utilities and taxes. I 
21 paid the utilities along with monthly bills at the cabin. 
22 Q When you say you paid for them? 
23 J A Out of household money that we were to pay, our 
24 money, that we were to pay our bills with. I was employed 
25 at the time, too. Some of mine would have gone into the 
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bills that I paid. 
Q Okay. And do you have checks to show that? 
A I did have. 
Q Where are they? 
A They were taken from my house. 
Q Okay. In addition to the physical improvements 
in the actual cabin, x^ here there also improvements made by 
Bear Lake Association? 
A Yes. During the course of the marriage there was 
a sewer line put in and that would have been at quite a 
substantial cost. That came in during the course of the 28 
years. 
Q Okay. Do you know who did that? Did the city or 
did the residents? 
A No. The residents had to pay for it, the 
residents that owned the property. 
Q I hand you Petitioner's Exhibit 4, (inaudible) 
and I'd also ask that the record reflect that Mr. 
(inaudibles). Can you identify that picture? 
A Yes. This is a very recent picture of the cabin 
at Bear Lake. This is a lot like what it looks now. It 
had the addition of the gate and some posts and some 
turrets. It's been made to look like a castle type of 
building now with the "A" frame being the old part that was 
in the center section. 
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Q Okay- Do you know about when this photo was 
taken? 
A This would have been taken probably in 1996. 
This is one of our granddaughters in front, Charlena and 
two of her friends as they went to the cabin. They are 
standing by the gate. 
Q And what's been added to the cabin specifically 
Lnce the last photograph? 
A More turrets and more castle like equipment. 
Q Okay. What about the roof? 
A It had a new roof from these early pictures. The 
roof was replaced with longer lasting shake shingles. 
Q Okay. All right. To your knowledge who paid for 
these improvements? 
MR. TYCKSEN: Objection. Foundation. Assumes 
she knows who paid for it. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that objection. 
But lay a better foundation and then re-ask the question. 
Q (BY MS. BEAN) Do you know who paid for that 
improvement on the roof? 
A Merlin would have paid for them. 
Q Okay. Do you know what funds he used? 
A No, I don't. 
Q Do you know what account that came out of? 
A No, I don't. 
49 
Q Why don't you know? 
A Because I never had a joint account and he was, 
he usually dealt in cash and he never told me what he was 
4 f doing with his money. He didn't really want to tell 
5 anybody about it. 
€ j Q Okay. Was any portion of this property sold 
f j during the course of the marriage? 
8 A Yes. The part that would, as Ifm looking at the 
3 photo, that would be on the left. An undeveloped piece of 
10 property to the left going North toward Fish Haven was sold 
11 to Gordon Reynolds for $5,000 when Merlin accepted a job in 
12 Florida, in 19 — 
13 Q Okay. How do you know how much that was sold 
14 for? 
15 A We paid, he used that $5,000 to finance the trip, 
ifi a, the move to Florida when he accepted a job with European 
17 Health Spa in 1971. 
18 Q Okay. You told the Court there were two lots. 
19 Are there now two lots (inaudible)? 
2 0
 A When we moved back fro^ i Florida in *74 we wanted 
21 to repurchase that land and it was repurchased from Gordon 
22 Reynolds for in excess of $20,000, to my knowledge. 
23 Q How do you know? 
2 4
 j A Merlin paid for it and he told me that he was 
going to buy it back but it was going to cost him, cost us 
50 
25 
Q Is that sufficient? Okay, During the course of 
your marriage when you would go up to this property what 
would (inaudible). 
A There was always lots of work to be done, I 
always cooked all the meals, washed all the dishes, cleaned 
the cabin, tried to make it an enjoyable weekend for 
everyone. I weeded in the yard. I eventually planted 
flowers, scrubs, and things in the yard to make it more 
beautiful. And then I took all the laundry home. The 
bedding and everything, the towels and all and washed 
during the week while I was working. 
Q Okay. Was this cabin for recreational purposes? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Did people recreate there? 
A Oh, yes, yes. 
Q What did they do? 
A They went water skiing and jet skiing and sun 
tanning and boating and played in the water. 
Q Okay. Was there equipment there to do that? 
A Yes, there certainly was. Much equipment. 
Q Okay. Like what? 
A There were multiple boats. At one time there 
were, as I recall, at least five nice boats and that would 
not include the sail boats nor the catamaran nor the 
canoes. There were also recreation vehicles. 
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himself out of the house. 
A There was an "L" shaped cut in the screen door 
and he had reached through to a handle and I asked him to 
replace the screen in the garage door or in the sliding 
kitchen door which was done. 
Q And how long ago was that? 
A That was a few years back before he left the 
house. 
Q Can you explain why you didnf t apply for other 
jobs? 
A Because I needed to be with my husband to help 
him keep a job and support him in keeping employment. He 
always asked me to come in and help him. 
Q Okay. And then counsel asked you if you thought 
it was fair that you would get the house and Merlin would 
get the cars and I think the pile of metal in the driveway. 
What are you actually proposing? 
A The home has been my only source of security in 
28 years. We have moved up and down. 
MR. TYCKSEN: Objection, your Honor, non-
responsive. If she could just answer the question— 
THE WITNESS: It is has been my only source — 
THE COURT: Just a moment. The objection is 
sustained. So counsel indicated to you what it is she 
proposes and if you wish to get into the reasons you can 
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then ask her then. 
MS. BEAN: Maybe I'll ask her specific questions, 
your Honor. 
Q (BY MS. BEAN) Do you believe you have an 
interest in the Bear Lake cabin? 
A Yes, the improvements during the time of the 
marriage. I worked very hard up there. 
Q Okay. Do you believe that Mr. Symes had an 
interest in the marital residence? 
A He's never wanted to live there. 
Q But a legal interest? 
A Probably. 
Q So, are you proposing that he keep the cabin and 
you keep the house? 
A Yes, That would be in good interest to all. 
Q Okay. And you're also proposing that he keep his 
cars, his boats, his jewelry, his toys? 
A Yes, I would want him to have those. 
Q All right. Are you in a position where you could 
go live with one of your children? 
A No, I could not. 
Q Why not? 
A My children are renting. My children are not in 
a good financial situation. I cannot — 
Q Could you live with them if you rented your home? 
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THE COURT: Would you return to the witness 
stand, please, Ma'am. 
Q (BY MR. TYCKSEN) I believe on redirect 
examination you said that you had been receiving Social 
Security disability since 1993? 
A That is correct. 
Q And that you've been receiving more or less $390, 
probably a little less earlier and it has gradually come up 
to $390; is that right? 
A That is correct. It started out at just a little 
over $300. 
Q What have you done with the $390 each month since 
you've started receiving it? 
A Using it to pay bills, food, medicine, household 
things totally. 
Q Where do you deposit that money? 
A It was deposited in my bank and sometimes the 
checks were just cashed and I went and paid bills. 
Q Okay. When did the bank statements that you had 
in your home get stolen? 
A During, well, I noticed them during the course of 
this last year. 
Q So when was the first time you noticed it? 
A I noticed it when I started cleaning out the 
house because I had kept them in a specific bag for a 
325 
Q In the past. Let me hand you what has been 
marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 26. And ask you if this 
shows (inaudibles) any other time. That's the insurance 
document that's (inaudibles), correct? 
A This is a copy of the insurance on the cabin and 
her name appears there and the reason why is because in 
order to insure the cabin you have to have a permanent 
residence that's insured also and then it's put on as like 
an auxiliary. 
Q Okay. 
A And our home in Layton on Woodridge Drive is in 
both of our names and consequently, I guess, if this is a 
copy of the insurance for Bear Lake that's probably the 
reason why her name's on it. That would be the only reason 
why her name would be on anything. 
Q Did you ever purchase a boat from your son, 
Craig? 
A Did I ever purchase a boat from Craig? 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A No, I did not. 
Q Never? 
A Well, we talked about it last night but I 
apparently suggested maybe he sell it to me but I never 
received it. He sold it to someone else. 
Q Who did he sell it to? 
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denied access to all of his records. He has a brain damage 
injury. He's subject to remembering what he can remember. 
Ifve had to meet with him repeatedly to get answers to 
those interrogatories. 
THE COURT: Well, if the interrogatories were in 
August and we're now in October, that's two months ago and, 
counsel, you recognize that those answers are to be filed 
within 30 days and if indeed you need more time you could 
have petitioned the Court and gotten a stipulation from 
Plaintiff's counsel. Correct? 
MR. TYCKSEN: I believe I had two weeks in the 
hospital during that period of time and it was right about 
the time they were due to be responded to and that's the 
time when we had the last continuance and when I got back 
to work I was overwhelmed with things. I'm a sole 
practitioner. I did everything I could to get my client 
and he was on vacation. When he returned we worked at it 
as fast as we could and last Friday I thought I was close 
to having them finished. He came in on Monday, we made 
some additional changes, and on Tuesday he came back to 
sign them and then I wasn't able to get them to her on 
Wednesday. 
THE COURT: And you have documentation to show 
that title is in the name of someone other than defendant? 
MR. TYCKSEN: I do. I have the deed and — 
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